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may constitutionally bar remedial actions as to rights al-
ready in existence if a reasonable opportunity is given in
which to assert them. No interest or claim is to be barred
by the new act until the lapse of one year after its passage.
The act provides that any person whose rights would be
barred now by the act must assert such rights by January
21, 1948, or be forever barred. Since the act does not take
effect until proclamation by the governor, there will be a
very short time in which these claims must be filed in order
to preserve them. 2
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Motor Carriers-The legislature made few important changes
or additions to public utility law. Chapter 299 permits a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity held by a com-
mon carrier operating motor vehicles on the public high-
ways to be sold, assigned, leased, bequeathed or transferred,
upon approval by the Public Service Commission, in part
as well as in the entirety. The prior act made no provision
for partial disposal.
Rate Bases-Chapter 307 provides that the Public Service
Commission in determining a rate base shall evaluate public
utility property according to its "fair value" instead of its
"current, fair cash value."' 2 This change in word formula
should make no difference in the Commission's technique.
The Commission is to give such consideration as it considers
appropriate to all bases of valuation which may be presented
or which the Commission has already been authorized to con-
sider. It is settled that a rate making commission is not
bound to any one or combination of rate formula.3
22. Thus one of the big questions in regard to the new act is whether
enough time is given in which to file notice to preserve claims.
The Michigan act of 1945, No. 200, from which this act was mod-
eled in part, allowed one year in which to file notice to save claims,
and the validity of the provision was questioned in 44 Mich. L.R.
45, and prophesy made that it would be held constitutional. No
cases are on record testing the constitutionality of that act. It
was also suggested with regard to the Michigan act that abstractors
might continue to trace titles back farther than the forty years
provided by the statute, but the new act would simplify the job
of advising clients as prospective purchasers.
1. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 47-1219.
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 54-203.
3. F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 319 U.S. 735 (1942).
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Warehouses-Chapter 318 limits the definition of "utility"
by excluding warehouse businesses for the storage of used
household furniture. Previously any warehouse service to
the public was included.- The act, however, does not specif-
ically define a warehouse business for the storage of used
furniture. Warehouses may be used to store both used fur-
niture and other articles. In such case it may be necessary
to decide whether the storage of used furniture is severable
from the storage of the other articles, or if not, what propor-
tion of the business must be devoted to the storage of used
furniture before the entire business will be excluded from
the general definition of "utility."
Telephone Companies-Chapter 270 provides an additional
remedy for the violation by any telephone company of any
law, or rule, regulation, or order of the Public Service Com-
mission. Any circuit court, upon a showing by the Com-
mission of a violation, and the interest of the public therein,,
may appoint a receiver to operate the telephone company
until such time as the court finds that the company will com-
ply with all rules, regulations and orders in the future. This
remedy is in addition to existing remedies-revocation of
permits or a money penalty. 6 Similar relief has been pro-
vided in the field of insurance,7 financial institutions,8 and
railroads.9
In the absence of this special statute, it is doubtful
whether a receiver would be appointed at the instigation of
the Commission as a remedy for the violation of a law or
Commission order, either under the general receivership stat-
4. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §" 54-105.
5. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 54-604. A permit may be re-
voked by the Commission for cause.
6. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 55-4203. For a violation of this
act (§§ 55-4201,55-4202) the telephone. company shall be liable
to an aggrieved party to appeal to a court of equity to prevent
such violations or discriminations by injunction or otherwise."
7. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 39-3401. The department of in-
surance, upon judicial order, may take possession of a business
and its property for the purpose of rehabilitation.
8. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 18-301. The department
of financial institutions may take possession of a business and
property of financial institutions whenever among other things
there is a violation of law, articles of incorporation, or rules and
regulations of the department.
9. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 55-716. The railroad commission
may apply to the court for the appointment of a receiver in case
a railroad does not comply with commission orders.
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ute or under the inherent power of a court of equity.10 The
act does not specify what damage to the public will author-
ize the appointment of a receiver. The appointment remains
discretionary with the court." Clearly a continued noncom-
pliance of an unimportant or technical nature will not cause
sufficient damage or injury to the public.12  In view of the
policy section: "no part of which (nationwide telephone sys-
tem) may be suspended without seriously and adversely af-
fecting the whole" and "the continuous operation of such
communications system is essential to the operation of the
economic life of the country and is necessary to prevent ex-
treme hardship" it is probable that the court will not appoint a
receiver unless the violation is of such a nature that con-
tinued telephone service will be interrupted or threatened.
The statutd provides that the receivership will continue
until it is found by the court that the telephone company
will "in all reasonable probability" comply with all regula-
tions in the future.1 3  Perhaps a change of public utility
officers or "good conduct" for a period under the receiver
will satisfy the court. The period of the receivership may
depend on the inertia of the court.
10. The general receivership statute, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)§ 3-2601, provides that a receiver may be appointed in various
cases at the instigation of a person interested in property to
protect that property from loss: "(7) And in such other cases
as may be provided by law; or where the discretion of the court,
or the judge thereof in vacation, it may be necessary to secure
ample justice to the parties." Steinbrenner Rubber Co. v. Duncan,
86 Ind. App. 218, 155 N.E. 625 (1926), interpreting this subsec-
tion said it is merely confirmatory of the jurisdiction exercised by
courts of equity. In the absence of statutory authority, a re-
ceiver can only be appointed in aid of an equitable proceeding.
Clark, "Receivers" (2nd ed., 1929) p. 58, § 51, also sets out that
an appointment is generally ancillary to a main action. See,
Farmers Grain Co. v. Toledo, Peoria, & Western R.R., 158 F.(2d) 109 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946), where the circuit court of appeals
disapproved of the appointment of a receiver to operate a railroadhaving crippling labor difficulties because there was no limita-
tion as to time and because it was not ancillary to other relief.
But see, The Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98,
103 (1895) which suggests that a suit may be brought in theinterest of the public when any corporation is doing acts detri-
mental to the public welfare. No instance in which a receiverhas been so appointed in Indiana has been found.
11. See Clark, "Receivers" (2nd ed. 1929) § 53.
12. See, Dept. of Insurance of Ind. v. Ind. Travelers Assuranee C"115 nd. App, 285, 58 N.E. (2d) '761 (1944). The court refused
to appoint a conservator to take possession of an insurance com-
pany as provided by ed. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 39-3401,
supra n. 7. It is not every irregular practice that will justify
granting of the application.
11. nd. Acts 1947, e. 270, §2.
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